A comparative study of the law relating to confessions. by Perkins, Mark Eversfield.
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A Compa r a tive Study of t ne 
Law Relating to Conf essions 
"When a confession is well proved 
it is the best evidence tha t c a n 
be produced . 11 
- Er le J . in R v . Baldry 
(1852) - 2 . Den 4 30 
169 E. R. 568 
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I ntroduction 
This paper will con sider f rom a comparative point of 
view the Law rel a ting to confession s in the t hree 
common law countrie s of En gl a nd, Austra li a and 
New zealand and the United States. In particular 
the study will be based on t he controls which each 
country i mposes on the ma nner i n which confessions 
can be obtained and the effect which brea ch of the 
rules has on their admissibility in Court. 
It will be seen that between the t hree comm on law 
countries to be discussed there are substantia l 
variations r a nging from the comparatively liberal 
approach (from the confessor's view point) adopted in 
England to the somewhat restrictive a nd confused 
approach adopted in New Zealand. In Australia there 
is even a great difference between the approaches of 
the various States. 
As far as the United States of Americ a is concerned 
this paper will consider mainly the series of decisions 
known as Miranda v. Sta te of Ari z ona (19 66) 384 U. S. 436; 
16 Led 694 . It will be seen that the United State's 
Courts have approached this question from a completely 
different view point to that adopted in the common law 
countries . Whereas the rules have been evolved from 
gradually established legal principles in the common law 
countries the United States has evolved its rules .through 
the 5th and 6th Amendments to the United States 
Constitution as contained in their Bill of Rights . 
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The eff ect of this approa ch in practica l terms has 
meant that in the United States there is a fa r greater 
control on the authorities obtaining t he confession 
(in the great proportion of cases the Police). 
The English Law, which has developed unf ettered by 
interference from politicians, also pl aces stringent 
control on the authority whereas in the State of 
Victoria, Australia, and New Zea l a nd the effect of 
Section 149 of the Evidence Act (Viet) 1958 a nd Section 
20 of the Evidence Act 1908 (NZ) has meant that the 
authorities wishing to use the confession in evidence 
have greater freedom to admit it despite any 
irregularities in its eliciting. Curiously enough these 
Statutory provisions were originally enacted in an 
attempt to codify the comm on law rules. 
The quotation from Baldry•s case which opens this paper 
that a well proved confession is the best evidence 
that can be produced gives a clue to the central problem 
relating to confessions. This problem is tha~ because 
a confession when admitted in evidence will usua lly 
procure a conviction on a criminal charge,the law must 
take care to protect individuals from over zealous and 
unscrupulous activities by persons in authority and in 
the great majority of cases the Police .. The respective 
demands of the society on the one hand for the conviction 
and punishment of a guilty party must be weighed against 
the right of the individual in a free society to be 
protected against abuse of pQwers given by the State 
to persons in authority. 
-
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In weighing up these factors it will be seen that the 
United States in adopting its approach has perhaps 
fallen too heavily in favour of the protection of the 
accused person's position . The position adopted in 
the United States is not surprising when one considers 
that the principles evolved in that country have a base 
in the Bill of Righ ts Amendments to the Constitutuion 
and therefore relate to the obsession which that country 
has to protection of the individual~ 
The New Zealand and Victorian positions have however gone 
to the opposite extreme and have allowed too much freedom 
to the Police and other persons in authority obtaining 
confessionsQ Both the New Zealand and Victorian positions 
were originally adopted in an effort to codify the common 
law rules. In 1949 it will be seen that the Statutory 
provisions were not as wide as originally though t and 
in New Zealand the Government Legisl a tur~ instead of 
completely reviewing the position, merely amended the 
legislation,which existed,to exclude a further part of 
the common law rule~ whic~ up until that time, operated in 
New Zealand and the situation now is that a large number 
of confessions which under the common law would be 
improperly obtained are admissible as evidence . 
The common law rules as they exist in England today 
present perhaps the most balanced approach to this question . 
These rules h ave been developed over a considerable period 
of time and have been tempered from time to time by the 
introduction of Judges • rules which in effect have 
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amounted to directions to the Police as to the manner 
in which they are to conduct themselves in obtaining 
confessions. This position is also true in the majority 
of Australian States. 
In England in 1972 there was an attempt to review the 
1aw relating to confessions and the Criminal Law 
Revision Committee in its report on the rights of the 
accused recommended among other things that silence in 
the Po'lice Station as regards any f act subse quently 
relied on at the trial could be made the subject of 
adverse comment by the prosecution and the Judge and 
could almost amount to corroboration. Foll owing this 
report the English Criminal Bar Association prepared a 
critique whereby they stated that the Criminal Law 
Revision Comrnittee•s proposal would have the effect 
of abolishing the right to silence. 
critique stated: 
·The Bar Association~ 
11 The right of silence istl1e concrete and visible 
assertion of the fundamental principle that the 
prosecution must prove their case, and no obligation 
lies upon the accused to prove his innocence o 
In qur view the vital point f or vigilance in a 
free society is the moment when the individual 
gets into the hands of the Police or an •official•. 
At that moment he will be alone. He will be faced 
with a person wielding extensive powers given by 
the State, with knowledge how best and to what 
extent they may be exercised. He will r equire, 
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in a free society, some protection against the 
abuse of those powers." 
It is proposed to consider at more length t his critique 
which was reviewed in The Guardia n of September 30 1972. 
The English Comm on Law Position 
There have been various attempts by legal writers to 
state the English Common Law Rule relating to admissibility 
of corife ssi ons. 
Halsbury.•s Laws of England, Third Edition, states at 
page 469 of Volume 1 O as follows: 
"... admissions or conf essions of guilt made by 
-a defendant before his trial can only be proved 
against him if they were made freely and 
voluntarily in the sense that they were not 
obtained from him by fear of prejudice or 
hope of advantage exercised or held out by 
a person in authori~y. In givi~g evidence of 
such admissions or confessions it lies on the 
prosecution to prove aff irmatively to the 
satisfaction of the Juqge who tries the case 
that the admissions were not induced by any 
promise of favour or advantage or by the use 
of fear or threats or pressure by a person in 
authority." 
The rule put another way can be found in cross ' Evidence•, 
Third Edition page 445: 
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11 A confession of crime is only admissible against 
the party making it if it was voluntary, i.e . 
provided it was not n:ade in consequence of an 
unlawful inducement or threat of a temporal 
nature held out by a person in authority (the 
expression •confession of crime • mus t be taken 
to include any inculpatory statement as well 
as a full admission of guilt). 11 
As to .what form the inducement or threat takes Cross 
goes on to say at page 447: 
11 •• • now that the accused can give evidence of 
their effect upon him, undue i mportance nust not 
be placed on words . As much may depend on the 
circumstances as on the terms of the inducement o ... 11 
Perhaps the most well known judicial statement of the 
rule can be found in the case of Ibrahim v. Rex 
C-191.17' A. c. 599 wherein a decision of the Privy 
Council delivered by Lord Sumner it is stated at page609 
of the report : 
11 It has long been established as a positive rule 
-of English Criminal Law that no statement by an 
accused is admissible in evidence against him 
unless it can be shewn (sic) by the prosecution 
to have been a voluntary statement, in the sense 
that it has not been obtained from him either by 
fear of prejudice or hope of advantage exercised 
or held out by a person in authority. The 
principle is as old as Lord Hale. 11 
'-
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Looking at the rule which is now firmly established in 
English law from the point of view of the effect of 
the rule in controlling the activity of the person in 
authority who is obtaining the confession it can be 
seen that such a person, who is usually a Policeman, 
must be careful in the words he uses in attempting to 
persuade the accused person to make a sta~ement. It is 
interesting to consider several of the earlier decisions 
which are examples of the words which are commonly used . 
It can be seen that some words used are such that the 
rule operates to hold them inadmissible. 
The case of R. v. Baldry which has been cited earlier 
involved the admissibility of a s!atement obtained 
from an accused by a police constable who stated to the 
accused prior to the giving of the adnission that the 
accused need not say anything to incriminate himself, 
what he did say would be taken down and used as evidence 
against him . The Court held that the Policeman ' s statement 
did not breach the rule and the statement was therefore 
held to be admissible . In the case of R. v. Jarvis (1867) 
L. R. 1CCR96 an employer said to his employee 11 I should 
advise you that, to any question that may be put to you, 
you will answer truthfully , so that if you have committed 
a fault you may not add to it by stating what is untrue 11 • 
It was held also in this case that this statement did 
not breach the rule and that the following confession was 
held admissible in evidence . In the case of R. v. Cleary 
(1963) 48 C. R. App . Rep . 116 the accused ' s father said 
to the accused in the presence of police officers "put 
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your cards on the table , tell them the lot, if you did 
not hit him they can not hang you. 11 The Court of Criminal 
Appeal held that in the circumstances the words used in 
this case were capable of constituting an inducement 
and therefore the confession was held inadmissible and 
the conviction was quashed. · In the case of Spark s v. 
~· {:196£' A.C.964 a confession of guilt of an indecent 
assault was held to have been wrongly received because 
it might have been made in consequence of suggestions by 
the Bermudan Police that, if the accused made a statement, 
he might be tried by a military court and his family would 
thereby be spared the embarrassment of publicity. In 
R. v. Smith f:195<y 20e B. 35 a soldier was stabbed in 
a fight following which the Regimental Sergeant Major 
made the whole unit stand on parade until he learned 
from the unit who was involved in the stabbing. A confession 
which was made shortly after this was held to be inadmissible. 
In English Law there is al so authority for the proposition 
that even if a confession is properly obtained the Court 
has an overriding discretion to disallow it. This principle 
was most clearly stated by Lord Parker c. J. in the case 
of Callis ·v. Gurin {:1964J ~· Q.B. 495 , 501 where it is 
stated: 
11 ••• in every criminal case a Judge has a discretion 
to disallow evidence, even if in law relevant and 
therefore admissible, if admissibility wouid 
operate unfairly against a defendant. I would 
add that in considering whether admissibility 
would operate unfairly against a defendant one 
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would certainly consider whether it had been 
obtained in an oppressive manne r by force or 
against the wishes of an accused person o That 
is the general principle. 11 
Lord Parker in the decision then went on to state the 
basic rule: 
11 when , however , one comes to the admissibility of 
of statements made in answer to the Police and 
to alleged confessions, a much stricter rule 
applies . There is a fundamental principle 
of Law that no answer to a question and no statement 
is admi ssible unless it is shown by the prosecution 
not to have been obtained in an oppressive manner 
and to have been voluntary in the sense that it 
ha s not been obtained by threats or inducements ." 
Lord Parker in his jud~nent then goes on to hold that 
the Judges Rules apply and indicate what Judges will 
exc lude within the meaning of oppressive conduct and 
what is or is not a voluntary statement . 
The Judges Rules were f irst formulated by the Judges 
of the Queen's Bench Division in 1912 to give an indicati on 
t o the Police as to tre proper course they should take 
at the various stages of an investigation . These rules 
have from to time been amended and the most recent list 
-of rules was given by Lord Parker Co J . at the sitting 
I 
of the Court of Criminal Appeal on 24 January 1964 . These 
rules now apply in England but have not been adopted in 
New Zealand and in this country the rules existing before 
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The amended rules announced in 1964 are as follows : 
1. When a Police officer is trying to discover whether , 
or by whom, an offence has been commi tted he is 
entitled to question any person, whether suspected 
or not, from whom he thinks that useful information 
may be obtained. This is so whether or not the 
person in question has been taken into custody so 
long as he has not been charged with the offence 
or· informed that he may be prosecuted for it . 
2. As soon as a Police officer has evidence which 
would afford reasonable grounds for suspecting that 
a person has committed an offence, he shall caution 
that person or cause him to be cautioned before 
putting to him any questions, or further questions, 
relating to that offence . 
The cautions shall be in the following terms: 
11 You are not obliged to say anything unless you 
wish to do so but what you say may be put into 
writing and given in evidence". 
When after being cautioned a person is being questioned, 
or elects to make a statement, a record shall be kept 
of the time and place at which any such questioning 
or sta ternen t began and ended and of the per sons present. 
3. (a) Where a person is charged with or informed that 
he may be prosecuted for an offence he shall be 
cautioned in the following terms: 
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11Do you wish to say anything? You arc not 
obliged to say anything unless you wish to 
do so but whatever you say will be taken 
down in writing and may be given in evidence." 
(b) It is only in exceptional cases that 
questions relating to the offence should be 
put to the accused person after he has been 
charged or informed that he may be prosecuted. 
Such questions may be put where they are necessary 
for the purpose of preventing or minimising harm 
or loss to some other person or to the public 
or for clearing up an ambiguity in a previous 
answer or statement. 
Before any such questions are put the accused 
should be cautioned in these terms: 
11 1 wish to put some questions to you about the 
offence with which you have been charged (or 
about the of fence for which you may be prosecuted) .. 
You are not obliged to answer any of the questions , 
but if you do the questions and answers will be 
taken down in wl'i ting and may be given in evidence." 
Any questions put and answers given relating to the 
offence must be contemporaneously recorded in full and 
the record signed by that person or if he refuses by 
the interrogating officer. 
(c) When such a person is being questioned , or 
elects to make a statement, a record shall be kept 
of the time and place at which any questioning or 
• 
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statement began and ended and of the persons 
pre sent . 
4 . All written statements made after caution shall 
be taken in the following manner: 
(a) If a person says that he wants to make a 
statement he shall be told that it is intended 
to make a written record of what he says . He 
shal 1 always be asked whether he wishes to write 
down himself yhat he wants to say; if he says 
that he cannot write or that he would like someone 
to write it for him , a Police officer may offer to 
write the statement for him. If he accepts the 
offer the Police officer shall , before starting, 
ask the person making the statement to sign , or 
make his mark to , the following : 
II I , 0 • • , wish to make a statement a I want someone 
to write down what I say. I have been told that 
I need not say anything unless I wish to do so 
and that whatever I say may be given in evidence . 11 
( b ) Any person writing his ovm statement shall 
be allowed to do so ,without any prompting as 
distinct from indicating to him what matters are 
material . 
( c) The person making the statement , if h~ is 
going to write it himself , shall be asked to 
write out and sign before writing what he wants 
to say , the following: 
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11 I make this statement of my own free will . I 
have been told that I need not say anything 
unless I wish to do so and that whatever I say 
may given in evidence . 11 
(d) Whenever a Police officer writes a statement , 
he shall take dow-r1 the words spoken by the person 
making the stater.1ent , without putting any questions 
other than such as may be needed to make the 
s~atement coherent, intelligible and relevant to 
the material matters : he shall not prompt him . 
( e) When the writing of a sta ter:ei'lt by a Police 
officer is finished the person making it shall 
be asked to read it to make any corrections, a lterations, 
or actdi tions he wishes . When he has finished reading 
it he shal 1 be a slced to write and sign or make his 
mark on the fol lowing certificate at the end of 
the statement : 
11 I have read the above sta tei;,en t and I have been 
told that I can correct, alter or add anything I 
wish . This statement is true . I have made it 
of my own free will . 11 
(f) If the person who has made a statement refuses 
to read it or to write the abovementioned certif icate 
at the end of it or to sign it, the Senior Police 
officer present shall record on the stater.{ent 
itself and in the presence of the person making 
it, what has happened . If the person making the 
statement cannot read, or refuses to read it, the 
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officer who has taken it down shall read it over 
to him and ask him whether he would like to 
correct, alter, or add anything and to put his 
signature or make his mark at the end. The 
Police officer shall then certify on the statement 
itself what he has done. 
5. If at any time after a person has been charged with, 
or has been informed that he may be prosecuted for 
al:'). of fence a Police officer wishes to bring to 
the notice of that per son any written statement 
made by another person who in respect of the same 
offence has also been charged or informed that he 
may be prosecuted, he shall hand to that person 
a true copy of such written statement, but nothing 
shall be said or done to invite any reply or comment. 
If that person says that he would like to make a 
statement in reply, or starts to say something, 
he shallat once be cautioned or further cautioned 
as prescribed by Rule 3 (a). 
6. Persons other than Police officers charged with the 
duty of investigating offences or charging offenders 
shall, so far as may be practible, comply with 
these rules. 
It must be emphasised that the Judges Rules are not rules 
of law and were first formulated merely as rulings on a 
number of enquiries which had from time to time been made 
by the Police as to the proper course they should take in 
the various stages of investigation. Nevertheless the 
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Courts have appeared to place reliance on these rules when 
deciding whether to exercise their discretion to exclude a 
legally admissible confession if it was unfairly obtained. 
Callis v Gurin is just such a case. There have been 
similar decisions in the other Common Law countries . It 
can also be noted when discussing the discretion that it 
existed prior to the Judges Rules and was exercised before 
their promulgation. 
Befor~ leaving the discussion of the English law some general 
comments can be made on the basic rules set out at the 
commencement of the paper. A person in authority has been 
held to mean anyone whom the confessor might reasonably 
suppose to be capable of influencing the course of the 
prosecution. Quite often it is a Police officer but it can 
be someone else as can be seen from some of the cases discussed. 
An inducement, the nature of which has been discussed earlier, 
is anything suggesting that the outcome of a confession might 
be some beneficial result in connection with the prosecution . 
It is necessary to mention here the case of Commissioners of 
Customs and Excise v Harz and Power (.-1967J 1 All E. R. 177 
where it was held by the House of Lords that , the principal that 
a confession or statement by an accused person is not admissible 
in evidence at his trial if it was induced by a threat or 
promise, applies equally where the inducement does not relate 
to the charge or contemplated charge as where the inducement 
does so relate . 
An improper inducement may be held to have become ineffective 
through lapse of time or because of some intervening cause. 
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It depends on the facts as to whether this happened. 
I 
A confession will be inadmissible if obtained at a time when 
the accused's mind was so unbalanced as to render it wholly 
unsafe to act upon it. There is Commonwealth authority for 
this proposition but no English authority. Where this ground 
is alleged it is suggested that the onus shifts to the accused 
rather than resting on the Crown as it does in all other 
cases. The fact, that the onus rests on the Crown :in proving 
the confession was voluntary, was clearly stated in the case 
of E v Thompson C-1893_7 2 Q. B. 12 by Cave J. In each case 
the trial judge has to ask, "Is it proved affirmatively that 
the confession was free and voluntary - that is, was it 
preceded by any inducement to make a statement held out by 
a person in authority?". 
There are three basic rationale for the present law as it 
exists in England. The rationale probably apply equally 
to the Commonwealth countries but have been fettered to some 
extent by the statutory positione Firstv a confession is the 
best evidence which can be produced. Secondly, if made freely 
it is probably true. Thirdly, there is the possibility that a 
confession which is not voluntary would be untrue and this 
fact has been uppermost in the Judge's mind when imposing the 
stringent requirements contained in the Judges Rules. 
But unreliability does not appear to be the sole ground. 
Allowance must be made for the dislike shared-by English lawyers 
and laymen alike of the spectacle of a man being made to 
incriminate himself. Also there is the desirability of doing 
everything possible to discourage improper Police methods. 
rn 
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In summary therefore it is suggested that the English law 
adopts a balanced approach to the question of what controls 
it imposes in the obtaining of confessions. First there 
is the basic rule that the confession must be voluntarily 
made. A confession can be an entire admission of guilt 
or any inculpatory statement. This rule alone places reasonable 
control on the Police when it is remembered that the Police 
have no power to detain any person for the mere purpose of 
interr_ogating him or while enquiries are being made. 
As a secondary control there is still the Judge's discretion 
to refuse to allow a legally obtained confession if to admit 
it would unfairly prejudice the accused. In exercising this 
discretion the Judges appear to rely on the Judges Rules. 
These rules themselves, as amended in 1964, impose very 
stringent requirements on the Police but, unlike the American 
position, allow the Police to operate effectively within the 
framework of the rules. 
The Australian Position 
Before dealing with the New Zealand law it is proposed to 
deal briefly with the Australian situation because the law 
as it exists in the state of Victoria has had considerable 
effect on the New Zealand law. 
Basically, in Australia the Common Law in England applies. 
The first deviation from the English situation as it exists 
at present is that the 1964 formulation of the Judges Rules 
does not apply in Australia. 
rn 
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XXW)0oc1>oeso:nrn:,oe~:x:bnot.u~ The 1912 formulation 
has been adopted in varying forms but again, like England, 
does not have the force of law and is merely "a guide to 
the Police in the questioning of suspects and arrested 
persons" ( Cross on Evidence Australian Edition - J A Gobbo 
-p.576). 
In the exercise of the overriding discretion which the 
Judge has to exclude a confession therefore the Judges' 
Rules 1912 apply in Australia . This means that the 
controls existing through evidentiary rules are less 
stringent than England in the majority of Australian 
States. Added to this is the fact that in Australia it 
is established that the accused person bears the onus of 
showing a case for the exercise of the Judge's discretion 
to reject a confession voluntarily made and therefore 
prima facie admissible . 
It is now necessary to discuss the statutory provisions 
enacted in some of the Australian States which amount to 
the second deviation ~rom the English law. In Queensland 
(Criminal Law Amendment Act 1894 s. 10) and New South Wales 
(N . s . w. Crime's Act 1900 s. 410) the Legislature has 
intervened only to the extent of certain deeming provisions 
that confirm and possibly extend the Common Law position. 
In Victoria, however, section 149 of the Evidence Act 1958 
saves from rejection as non-voluntary a confession induced 
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by a threat or promise if the inducerr,ent was not really 
calculated to cause an untrue admission of guilt to be 
made . The section reads as follows; 
11 No confession which is tendered in evidence 
shall be rejected on the g-..cound that a promise 
or threat has been held out to th2 person 
confessing , unless the Judge or other presiding 
officer is of the opinion that the inducement 
was. really calculated to cause an untrue 
admission of guilt to be made; nor shall any 
confession which is tendered in evidence be 
rejected on the ground that it was nade or 
purports to have been made on oath . 11 
As s tated earl ier it is curious that the rationale for 
the ru l es was that it was an attempt to codify the 
common law . In fact it amounts to a serious abrogation 
of the coffimon law and in theory equally seriously detracts 
from the controls which the Courts exercise through the 
evidentiary rules on Police practices . Naturally enough 
Australian (and as will be discussed later, New Zealand) 
lawyers made efforts to limit the effect of this statutory 
rule in Victoria. To the extent that the statutory rule 
could be excluded in its operation so would the greater 
controls existing under the English law pplyo Originally 
the section was treated by the Victorian Court as covering 
the whole field of confessions and excluding totally the 
common law . This meant therefore that strictly interpreting 
the section even a threat of physical violence , if the 
Judge was of the view that this did not result in an untrue 
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confession, would not result in an exclusion of the 
confession from the evidence. 
The harsh effects of the section were mitigated by the 
case of Cornelius v. R. (1936) 55 c. 1. R. 25 and R. v. Lee 
(1950) 82 c. L. R. 133. These decisions made it clear 
that the section was limited to statements that amounted 
to admission of actual guilt of the crime in question and 
that were induced by a threat or promise by a person in 
authority. Where there was some other ground for rendering 
the confessionron- voluntary or some other basis for 
exercising a discretion to reject, the section did not apply. 
Where it did apply, however, it was imperative and left 
no room for the exercise of discretion. 
In the Cornelius case it was stated by the majority 
decision at page 246: 
11 Thi s, no doubt, correctly states the ef feet of 
the provision. When it appears that, but for 
a particular promise or threat made by a person 
in authority, the prisoner's confession would 
be voluntary, it becomes necessary for the Judge 
at the trial to decide whether the promise or 
threat in question was really calculated, that is, 
really likely, to c au.se an untrue ad11ission of 
guilt to be made . But a promise of advantage 
and a threat of harm are not the only matter s 
which may deprive a statement of its voluntary 
character. For instance, a confession which 
is extracted by violence or force , or some other 
m 
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i-'or,.t of c1ctual cvercion is clearly i:r,vo11,..;". tary , 
and , tnerefore, c a nnot be received in evidence . 
The enact:nent dos not :celate to such c a ses . 11 
Tne Courts , there1:'ore, through ~hese cases were: li r:.iting 
the section to the exact situations ·.rnich it prescribed . 
In t~1i s way the co;r,r,.o.r1 law rules car .. e o have grea. ter 
ef f eet w11ere a s previously it was thought tt1eJ w2re 
completely excluded . 
In Victoria it has cbviously been seen by the Legisl a ture 
that section 149 , if its aim was to codify the cor;-. ,on l.:i.w , 
had a serious effect in limitation of the Police conduct 
by the Court . No further attempts have been made to 
close the gap which was created by the Lee and Cornelius 
decisions . The present law there can be regarded as 
unsatisfactory but not to the extent that ew Zealand law 
can be regarded as being so where further atter:-,pts have oeen 
made by the Legislature in this c ountry to seriously 
interfere with the common law . 
The ew Zealand Position 
The extent to which the common law applies in ew Zealar.d 
is determined by the effect of section 20 of the Evidence 
Act 1908 which is an enactment similar , although now far 
wider in its operation , to section 149 of the Victorian 
Act . 
Because of the difficulty in Kew Zealand resulting fror., the 
fact that the corrunon law rules have to be read in conju:riction 
with section 20 there is sorr,e doubt a. s to '1111 · t a o "',_ , 1.. u,,.  S ~C 
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coL.c·cssion. ':'his isi: . portant becc .. us2 sectior, 20 relates 
only to confessio. sand if fr.ls :..s -'-o be de~ir,ec. as mea;· . i.i1s 
a iul coniession ~~ s;uilt t1er: t:r.:.s is .:1 i'u.1't1er way 
u , \.;Acluding the op~r2.tion 0.1. t 1e sectlGr1 and alowing ti.e 
r o, . mon law rules to applJ. 
.. _ 1. L.,d . on l a w rules of course apply to both ful ctdrnissions 
oi guilt and mere inculpator:1 or exculpatory stater,ents. 
I f the lct L ter does not come within the definition o f 'co ~~  ssi Of.' 
in section 20 then that section' s op2ration is limited to 
only a complete admission. With any thing else the cor .. or. 
law applies. The second New Zealand edition of 'Cross on 
Evidence' also discusses this problem and as a definitiOD 
states at page 501: 
11There is some ambiguity in the notion of a 'confessio .' 
which has three possible r,eanings. It . ,ay mean, first, 
an acknowledgement of guilt of the crime with which 
the accused has been or is later charged. Secondly, 
it may Jr,ean a statement going to the length of 
suggesting .the inference that the person ma~ing it 
is guilty of a crime (though not necessarily of 
the crime charged). Thirdly, it ;r,ay i1 elude not 
only con-,plete con2e ssions of guilt, but al so any 
arunission of a fact in issue or other facts relevant 
to the proof  of guilt. 11 
The development of the New 6ealand law re~-~ing to 
confessions can best be seen thro~gh a discussion oi 
several 0 £ the major cases. It should be re . ,e.r,bered t.r.-c 
an overriding factor in al cases is the effect of secc:.1.vl, 
• 
rT1 • 
1 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
Up until 19)0 the section re ad : 
11 A conf essim1 'cendered in evidence in any 
criJ,1ina l proceeding shall not be rejec ced on 
tl1e ground that a pro~i. ise or tnreat has been 
held out to the person confessing , unless t e 
Judge or other presiding off icer is of the 
opinion that the inducement was in fact likely 
to cause an untrue admission of guilt to be 
n,ade . 11 
In the case of R. v. Coats C 1932J . z . L. R. 401 . an 
attenpt was made to define the word •confession • as it 
appeared i n the sec tion at t hat tiffie . Myers c . J . stated 
a t page 405 : 
11The point that calls for determination nere has 
to be determined on the construction of our own 
statu te . In my opinion the word •confession • means 
just what it says and no raore . 
In ny opini on , on the true construction of that 
se c tion , the word •confession • n,eans an adJnission 
of guilt - that is t o say , an ad;.,ission of guilt of 
the of fence which is actually before the Court . 11 
Smith J. stated at page 408 of the report : 
11 In my opinion , the c onfessi on referred to in S. 20 
of 1:he Evidence Act , 1908 , must amount to an 
admission of guilt . The person ch.J.rged r,,ust use 
such words in such circu,istances as to show that 
he .1clcn0wledge s his guilt . 11 
• 
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This decision re-enforces the view that in 1 ew Zealand 
s.;1here section 20 applies it only applies to full adrr,issions 
of guilt . The common law applies to anything less than 
that . 
The next decision to consider is R. v . Gurdner [:1932J 
N. Z. L. R. 1648 . In this case a young Maori boy aged 16 years 
suspected of a crime was taken from his guardian~ home 
at 11 p . m. He was handcuffed to a policerr,aY, and taken along 
an unJ.it bush track to a waiting police car . He was tnen 
taken to the police station where at 4 a . m. he finally 
made a statement confessing to a murder. He was not 
originally taken in for questioning on the matter of 
the murder but on other unrelated offences. Smith J. held 
that the confession was inadnissible but had this to say 
in interpreting section 20 of the Evidence Act; (page 1649) 
11 In New Zealand, in all cases where a prora se or 
threat has been used, the provisions of s . 20 of 
the Evidence Act , 1908 , are applicable, with the 
result that, even though a confession is induced 
by a promise or threat , it is admissible unless 
the Judge is of the opinion that the induce1 ,ent 
offered or made was in fact likely to cause an 
untrue admission of guilt to be made . In ny 
opinion , this is not the only rule to be applied 
in excluding a confession in New Zealand. Where 
-no prm:--,i se or threat can be said to have been 
used , yet if a violent procedure has been adopted 
when the confession was obtained and the Crown 
cannot show that the confession w snot induced 
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t:n.c 
b; such violent procedure ,/cor..fessio:i1 then 
obtained cannot, in r..y opinion, be regarded 
as free voluntary." 
This part of Smith J . 's jud~Jent wa s expanded in the 
case of R. v . Phillips L1919J ·. z . L.R . 316 . It was 
in fact an expression of the scllr,e rule put forward 
in the Cornelius decision in Victoria . When Gardner 
went on appeal, however, a different approach was adopted 
as can be seen from the two following passages. Myers c. J. 
page 1660 stated: 
11 I see no reason for thinking that for the purpose 
of this section it is necessary that d threat 
should be made in words. I cannot see why the 
circumstances may not be such as to imply a 
threat , and I thinl< this is so in this case . 11 
Herdman J . at page 1664 stated along similar lines: 
11 A promise or threat need not be expressedo It 
may be implied from the conduct of the person 
in authority , the declarations of the prisoner , 
or the circumstances of the case ••• 11 
The Court then exercised its discretion under the section 
to exclude the state1 Lent . The introduction of the doctrine 
of implied threat followed by an exercise of the discretion 
ve s ted when interpreting section 20 was one further attempt 
by the Court to diminish the effect of that section . However, 
it was perhaps placing too wide an interpretation on the 
words and was not endorsed by the case of R. v . Phillius 
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which adopted Smith J•' s interpretation in the judgment 
of the lower Court. The Phillips decision had far reaching 
effects on section 20 of the Evidence Act , 1908, and the 
Legislature in the f ollowing year in stead of taking the 
opportunity of re-considering and perhaps abolishing the 
section took the strange course of ar:,ending the section 
to close the gap which had been opened by the Court decisions. 
There is no real need for the provision in either New Zealand 
or Victorian law but the politicians, supposedly well advised, 
did not see it that way. While on the one hand the Courts 
were making valiant efforts to evolve more control over the 
taking of confessions by the Police the Legislature on the 
other hand was doing its upmost to lessen the control. 
In the Phillips case a nurse faced charges rel a ting to the 
poisoning of a nursing sister at her hospital . A confession 
was obtained after statements were made to her by the 
detective conducting the inquiry. These statements amounted 
to a persuasion to admit guilt and consisted in telling 
the accused that all the evidence pointed to her (which as 
it turned out was not correct), the harrassing nature of 
the questioning in the face of her ma ny denials, the 
reference to her previous conviction for theft, the suggestion 
that if a statement were not made then a more serious 
charge such as attempted murder would be brought, and lastly 
the suggestion that her nursing bursary might be affected. 
It was held that the detective was definitely -0 person 
in authority in terms of the common law rule . 
The statements by the detective in this case amounted to 
• 
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less than 11 a promise or threat 11 and the Court, instead 
of u.dopting the view taken by the Court of Appeal in 
Ga rdner , held that where there is something less than 
a prorni se or threat then section 20 does not apply at all 
and the common law rules u. re then adopted . In stating 
the principle O'Leary c. J . at page 340 said: 
11 1 t was , I think , assumed in New Zealand , as apparently 
it was in Victoria , that the section was an accurate 
expression of the common law, which it was thought 
dealt only with confessions , and that "threats and 
promises" were the only kind of inducements which 
coul d be taken into consideration . This was not 
the full sweep of the c ommon law , as I will show 
later . 11 
The Cornelius decision had of course long been made when 
Phillips came before the New Zealand Court . O' Leary c. J . 
we nt on to say at page 344 : 
11 Summarising what I have said , the common law 
appears t o be that evidence of a statement or 
c onfession by the accused is admissible only if 
I the prosecution prove s to the satisfaction of 
the Judge that it was made perfectly voluntary. 
Fur ther , the evidence is inadmissible if it 
is the result of an inducement made by some person 
in authority , and induc ements are not restricted 
to promises or threats . The inducement need not 
be of such a charac ter as is likely to cause an 
untrue confessi on . 
rn 
• 
n1 • 
~ 
3 
1 
1 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
- 29 -
This, then was the position when s~20 was passed. 
That section dealt with two specific kinds of 
inducements - promises and threats - and such 
were not to be rej_ected unless they were in 
fact likely to cause an untrue admission of 
guilt . Obviously it did not cover the whole 
field of the cot:,m on law, though, as I mve said 
earlier , it apparently was mistakenly thought 
to do so. It therefore left the common law 
to a pply in all respects other than those 
covered by the section itself. 
Remembering that the common law rejects only 
statements or confessions induced by persons 
in authority, and that statements not so 
induced are arunissible, the question arises 
whether there is any such limitation imposed 
·bys. 20 . On this the section is silent , but 
as it was to an extent stating the corrunon law 
I think the restriction should apply to cases 
coming under that section - that _is, it is 
only promises OT threats made by a person in 
authority that are covered by the section." 
in 
The Court in this case also made it plain that/section 20 
by a •confession• is meant a co,plete admission of guilt 
in respect of the offence with which the accused is charged, 
but there may be statements exculpatory and other than 
confessions which may well be considered inadmissible for 
the same reasons that confessions are . 
rn 
• 
rT1 .. 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
- 30 -
Despite the fact that the Court was attempting to limit 
the operation of section 20 so that the co~mon law rules 
could be adopted , it could al so see that there would be 
a danger in being too liberal . It has been stated earlier 
that there is a balance which must be obtained between 
allowing the criminal to be free frorr, harrassrnent and 
allowing the Police enought freedom to adequately investigate 
crime . On this balance O' Leary c. J . had this to say at 
page 339 of the report : 
"• •• whilst no Judge desires to hamper the Police 
in the bringing of criminals to justice , some 
balance must be kept , and , whilst the law 
requirements must be complied with before staten-,ents 
of accused can be made use of in evidence , restrictions 
of two onerous a character should not be pl~ced upon the 
pe r son whose duty it is to investigate and detect 
·c rime . Without information , the truth cannot be 
asce rtained and justice cannot be done , and it is 
the duty of the Polic e properly to secure information 
f or use in the Courts of Justice . " 
Fol l owing the Phillips case the New Zealand Government 
i n troduced an amendment to the Evidence Act 1908 and 
a new secti on 20 was enacted . It reads as f ollows: 
" A c onfe ssi on tendered in evidence in any cri~inal 
proceedings shall not be rejected on the ground 
that a promise or threat or any other inducement 
( not being the exercise of violence or force or 
other f orm of c ompulsion) has been held out to 
rn 
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or exercised upon the person confessing , if the 
Judge or other presiding officer is satisfied 
that the means by which the confession was 
obtained were not in fact likely to cause an 
untrue admission of guilt to be made . 11 
The effect of the amendment was to bring to an end the 
interpretation adopted in Phillips and to change the 
onus of proof from the accused (as it 
earlier section) to the prosecution. 
had been under the 
It is interesting to consider the parliamentary debates 
on the amendment . (New Zealand Parlian:entary Debates , 
Volume 290 P.P. 1891-1895 and Volume 291 P.P. 238- 2390). 
The Bill was introduced by the Hon . Mr Webb ( Atto:rney General) 
wh o appears to have known precious little abou1: the 
existing law when recommending the Bill to Parliarr;ent . In 
fa c t he went so far as to say that the amendment would 
bring New Zeal and into compliance with English Law: A 
debate then arose between himself and the Right Hon . ~r Nasn 
who thought the mere fac1: that we had section 20 at all 
was inequit able. One of the lawyers in the House , the 
Hon. Mr Algie (Minister of Education and later Speaker) 
appeased Mr Nash by advising him that the Courts had an 
overriding discretion to exclude this statement even if 
it was admissible under the first part of the section . I n 
discussing the background to the amenrunent he stated: 
11 In the early days of our criminal ju:ci sprudence 
it was the policy of our law to f orce the Crown 
to prove its case against the prisoner right up 
to the hilt . The reason was that historically 
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it was in many cases not co, petent for the 
prisoner to give evidence on his own behalf; 
so those technical and artificial rules were 
developed fror11 time to time, and nowc1days they 
look rather extraordinary. The purpose of 
criminal justice is to put before the Court all 
the relevant evidence tha t is available . But 
it was for a long time a principle of our 
jurisprudence that if a promise, threat, or 
inducement was held out to a person confessing, 
then the confession was automatically rejected. 
That resulted in very good decisions being made 
in the great majority of cases, but this was 
the sort of thing that could occur: A promise, 
threat, or inducement might be proved, and 
then the confession would be auto natically 
excluded whether the promise or threat had 
any operative effect." 
The Hon. Mr Mason who had earlier been Attorney 
General in the Labour Government could see 
perhaps more clearly than all others involved 
in the debate what was basically treproblem. 
This is seen in the fol lowing passages from his 
speech: 
11 c1ause 3 raises difficulties ••• but, unfortunately, 
in one sense the difficulty ••• relates rectlly to 
so much of the cl ause as expresses the present 
law - ~his is a re-enacting clause, but really 
all the words as to which he raises questions are 
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the old words . 
The new part of it really is •any other inducement•. 
The point about it is that 'pronise or Lhreat • 
is the expression used in the existing legislation, 
and if the observation made to the prisoner is 
weaker than that, then the evidence cannot be 
tendered, no matter how much less that weaker 
to 
thing was likely/have had influence than would 
the strong8r thing. That is the absurdity that 
we were confronted with and that is the di ff iculty 
of resisting this clause, because the clause 
eliminates what is complete absurdity. That 
is not tojustify the old section, of course, 
and i f one were entering upon that old section 
f or the first time, then many considerations would 
arise ••• " 
The Bill was passed and the opportunity which had 
presented itself by virtue of the Phillips case wa s lost. 
In seeing the difficulties the Court of Appeal was under 
as a result of section 20 the Legislature should have 
abolished the section and reverLed to the corr~on law. For 
some strange reason they went in the opposite direction 
and what followed was the most repressive l2£j'islation 
in the law relating to confessions of any of the four 
countries here under consideration. 
The original rationale for section 20 was that it was 
an attempt to codi fy the co nmon law rules. This was 
understandable having regard LO the zeal with 
m 
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which New Zealand hus codified its criminal law. The 
rationale for the amendment in 1950 is unclear . The 
Edi t ion 
New Zealand/of Cross on Evidence has this to say: (page 505) 
11 The rationa£ of s . 20 in its present form is 
l .. , . 
.LCC l J • , •,, ~c ssor Cowen and Vir · Carter, who 
suggest that the words 'other form of cDr,1pulsion 1 
would cover Police interrogation of suspected 
persons in custody, conwent that it is 1 difficult 
to see the principle which tests conf essions 
induced by threats or promises by truth, but not 
those obtained by the nagging tactics of Police 
interrogations' . But it is submitted that o~ly 
an extremely oppressive interrogation could 
properly be described as a 'form of compulsion', 
so that this criticism may rest on a false premise . 
The basic idea underl~ring s . 20 1 s plain enough: 
Therecomes a point at which the dislike of self 
incrimination and the desirability of discouraging 
imprc,per Police methods prevail over the objective 
of arriving at the truth, andthat point is reached 
when violence or force are used on a suspected 
person . Whether this rationale also serves when 
an ' other form of corn pul sion' has been used 
must remain doubtful so long as it is uncertain 
what amounts an ' other form of compuls.ion 1 • 11 
An attempt by the Courts toprovide a rationale can be 
found in the judgmen t of Turner J. in the ease of 
Naniseni v . The Queen ;- 1971 ~ 6 L _; N. Z. L. R. 2 9 , 275 : 
rn 
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"It may indeed be possible to contend that the 
tide is turning and that in an age in ·.vhich the 
general level of education has tended to make 
accused persons well aware of their rights it is 
quite 
not necessary to give them/the same degree of 
protection as seemed to be required in the days 
of _g v Thompson . 11 
As stated earlier there is Commonwealth authority for the 
propo~ition that a confession will be inadmissible if 
obtained at a time when the accused' s mind was so unbalanced 
as to render it wholly unsafe to act upon it . One such 
dec i sion is R v Williams f1952,7 NZLR 502, a case incidentally 
where section 20 of the Evidence Act 1908 was held to be 
exc luded bec ause no promise, threat or inducement was made . 
Hardie- Boys J on the question of the accused's state of mind 
s.ai d : 
'' Anything in a criminal case which purports to be a 
confession or admission is a solemn statement or 
document to which a clear and not a distorted or 
di s ordered mind should be brought ; the very choice 
or decision to make it at all must be voluntary . 
I t is e s sential that the Judgment is not clouded 
nor the mind overwro~ght , although mere remorse and 
a desire to repent do not make it inadmissible . It 
must be the result of conscious recollection of the 
detail of the events described and not a recorEtruction 
put together while the body is exhausted and the mind 
in a condition to be over - borne , so that every instinct 
m 
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would be to have it finished as shortly and as 
simply as possible and gain respite and rest ••• " 
The case of 1 aniseni , however, placed a limitation on the 
ambit of this statement . In the Judgment of Turner J at 
m 
page 274 it reads :- ~ 
" What must appear , if a confession is to be held 
voluntary is in our opinion no more and no less 
than that it has been made by the prisoner , his 
vri.11 in making it not being over-borne by the \'rill 
of some other person by means of some consideration 
such as has been menti oned above. Not that the 
considerations which we have ennumerated are to be 
narrowly interpreted as constituting a necessarily 
exhaustive list. But the factor which is relied 
upon as having over-borne, or is apt to over - bear , 
the will of the prisoner must be found in the will 
·of some other person, by the exertion of which his 
confession is induced or is deemed by the law to have 
been induced. The will of some other person is 
essential; the involuntariness cannot be produced 
from within . Such consideration as fatigue, lack 
of sleep, emotional strain, or the consump tion of 
alcohol, cannot be efficacious to deprive a confess ion 
of its quality of involuntariness , except, perhaps, 
so far as any of these may have been brought about or 
aggravated, by some act or omission of other persons 
to the end that a confession should be made . Of course 
suc h considerations as we have mentioned , while not 
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suf £1'.:ien t to deprive a confession of its 11 volun tary" 
quality , may yet be relevant to subsequent stages 
of the matter . The?y may be relevant in the exercise 
of the Judge's discretion, and which he may decide, 
as a matter of fairness, not to admit the confession 
in evidence . Further, if he decides to admit it , 
the same consideration may be canvassed again before 
a jury, as a point of criticism against its probative 
effect . " 
Despite the limitations imposed by Naniseni it is in this 
area relating to the confessois mental state that the corrui10n 
law ru l e of voluntariness still applies so long as section 
20 is excluded fr om operating by virtue of the facts of the 
case . 
The operation of section 20 can also be limited to a large 
extent by the sensible exercise by the Courts of the 
di s cretion left to them by the section itself . In exercising 
thi s discretion the Courts will , as in England , be swayed 
by the effect of the Judge ' s Rules in each case . The 1964 
amended rules do not apply in New Zealand but those applying 
ar e as f ollows :-
1 . . When a Police officer is endeavouring to discover the 
author of a crime , there is no objection to his 
putting questions in respect thereof to any person 
or persons , whether suspected or not, £'".corn whom he 
thinks that useful information can be obta{ned . 
2 . Whenever a Police officer has made up his mind to 
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charge a person with a crime , }1e sho;,i.ld first 
caution such person before asking hir, any questions , 
or any further questions , as the case maybe . 
3 . Persons in custody should not be questioned without 
the usual caution being first ad~inistered . 
4 . If the prisoner wishes to volunteer any statement , 
the usual caution should be administered . 
It is desirable that the last t i.:10 words of the 
usual caution should be omitted, and that the 
caution should end with the words 11 be given in 
evidence" . 
5. The caution to be administered to a prisoner, when 
he is formally charged , should therefore be in the 
following words, 11 Do you wish to say aiythi:rg in 
answer to the charge? You are not obliged to say 
anything unless you wish to do so , but whatever you 
say will be taken down in writing and maybe given 
in evidenc e". 
Care should be taken to avoid any suggestion that 
his answers can only be used in evidence against 
him , as this may prevent an innocent person making 
a statement which might assist to clear him of the 
c harge . 
6. A statement made by a prisoner before there is time 
to cau tion him is not rendered inadmissible in 
evidenc e merely by reason of no caution having been 
given, but in such case he s hould be cautioned as 
m 
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soon as possible. 
7. A prisoner making a voluntary statement must not 
be cross- ex~~ined , and no questions should be put 
to him about it except for the purpose o.f removing 
an a~biguity in what he has actually said . For 
instance , if he has mentioned an hour without saying 
whether it was morning or evening , or has given a 
day of the week and day of the month which do not 
agree, or has not made it clear to what individual 
or what place he intended to refer in some part of 
his statement, he may be questioned sufficiently to 
clear up the point. 
8. When two or more persons are charged with the same 
offence and statements are taken separately from the 
persons charged, the Police should not read these 
statements to the other persons c }1arged , but each of 
_such persons should be furnished by the Police with 
a copy of such statement , and nothing should be said 
or done by the Police to invite a reply . If the person 
charged desires to make a statement in reply, the 
usual caution should be administered . 
9. Any statement made· in accordance with the rules above 
should, whenever possible , be talcen do\1m in writing and 
signed by the person making it after it has been read 
to him and he has been invited to make any corrections 
he may wi sh . 
The cases B. v . Convery L196~7 NZLR 426 and 
Naniseni also have something to say on the exercise of the 
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Judge's discretion . In Convery Turner J stated at page 436 : 
" A challenge to the admissibility of incriminating 
statements made before trial by an accused person 
one 
maybe presented or/ of two quite distinct grounds . 
First, it maybe submitted that the Crmvt1 has not 
satisfactorily shown the statements to have been 
made \duntary . (It maybe added here that in cases 
where the Crown fails to pr ove involuntariness, 
s . 20 of the Evidence Act 1908 may still be invoked, 
and in cases to which that section is held applicable 
statements maybe admitted, even where not sho~m to 
be voluntarily . ) Secondly, even if state~ents tendered 
are ruled admissible in law, the Trial Judge (at least 
in cases in which no ruling has been given in favour 
of the Crown under s . 20) still has a discretion to 
reject them if he is of the opinion that the 
_procedure under which they were obtained was unfair 
t o the accused . This discretion is a comparatively 
modern development . " 
The same Judge in t he latter case at page 271 similarly 
sta t ed :-
" Even if a c onfession is shm1m to be voluntary ••• 
it will not necessarily be allowed by the Trial 
Judge to be produced at the trial . The discretion 
of the Court may at this stage be used to reject a 
confession obtained by unfair means . 11 
In summary therefore the New Zealand law as now developed 
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is extremely and unnecessarily complex . It is so because 
of the curious conflict which arose in the first half of 
the century between the Judiciary and the Legislature . 
This conflict was resolved in an unsatisfactory way by the 
amendment to Section 20 in 1950 . It was unsatisfactory 
because insufficient weight appears to have been placed 
by Parliament on what the Judiciary was trying to say . If 
the common law is now to be excluded then in the words of 
Cr oss ( NZed) : -
"There is a case for an authoritative statutory 
formulation of a code dealing with confessions, 
not only t o remove some of the uncertainties caused 
by partial s tatutory modification of the common la\11, 
but al s o t o enable the law to be fashioned on the 
basis of a c onsistent rationale ." 
Before leaving the New Zealand situation and considering 
the ·American system which represents the opposite extreme , 
i t is interesting to consider a recent development in 
New Zealand law which to some extent relates to tne 
American . It is strange that this development should have 
occurred having regard to the complex situation set out 
above . It can be stated , however , that the New Zealand 
Courts have been extremely innovative in the field of 
confessions and this new development is merely a Yt.ll'ther 
example of i t . 
In an article "Access t o a Solicitor after Arrest" by 
Dr M W Doyle !_'f9 7g NZL J 420 there is collected together 
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a number of recent unreported New Zealand decisions on 
the accused person's right to a solicitor after arrest. 
These decisions have also been briefly rep9rted from tir.1e 
in 
to time in Recent La·:r. There is no righ tl 1a01, in New Zffiland 
to see a solicitor at the Police station at the time of 
arrest . There is, however , a Police Department directive 
that arrested persons be allowed to see a solicitor . 
The Courts have based their intervention into this field 
on the, discretion which they have to disallow a confession 
even though legally obtained. There are three cases where 
the Courts have dealt with the matter . 
The first is Nazer v The Ministry of T-..cansport reported 
/_197]} Recent Law 117 . In this case Speight J considered 
an appeal by a Defendant who had been convicted of refusing 
to supply a blood sa11ple under sectiorJ. 58C of the T-..cansport 
Act 1962 . The Defendant claimed that as he was denied 
access to a solicitor after the second breath test the 
entire procedure was invalid . It is true that this case 
is outside the field of confessions but part of the Judgment 
relates in principle 
"I repeat that there can be no excuse for the conduct 
of the Officers engaged in this affair . Sven if a 
person is arrested he must not be held incommunicado, 
and if a sensible bona fide request is made for a 
soliciiDr or any other appropriate person to be 
communicated with , then attempts should be·macie to 
facilitate this . It maybe that circumstances do not 
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permit it for remoteness or other reasons. Dut 
here, at the Central Police Station , there is 
a public telephone in the lobby <J.nd doubtlC!SS 
ample Police Department telephon2s readily to 
hand . No procedures or requirements which it 
was the duty of Officers to carry out \i/ould have 
been impeded by allowing the suspect to conrnmnicate 
with his solicitor ." 
The Judge held that the breath test was valid but to further 
mark his disapproval the Judge discharged the Appellant 
under s. 42 of the Criminal Justice Act 1954. 
The second case is R v Puhipuhi !._197 ].7 Recent La\'.; 1 39 . In 
this case a 1 6 year old Maori boy refused to make a 
statement unless he could contact a solicitor first . The 
Police took a verbal statement from him without allowing nim 
to contact his solicitor and without informing him that a 
verbal admission could be used against him . 
In considering whether to exercise his discretion to exclude 
the confession Cool<e J adopted Convery' s case and cm1cerned 
himself with the spirit of the Judge's Rulesrather than the 
technical application . He decided to exclude the 
confession in t his case . 
The third case is R v McDonald (unreported - Auc kland 9 May 
1974 per Mahon J ). In this case the accused was found by 
-Police , searched and placed in a patrol car for transportation 
to the Police Station. He was told he was wanted for 
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questioning . The questioning lasted for two hoUTs and 
was conducted in a manner ~~ounting to cross-examination . 
Mahon J accepted that the accused was unwilling to make 
a statement until he had seen a solicitor . Access to a 
solicitor was denied . Eventually he made a statement 
which the Judge held, following Convery, that although 
voluntary , was not admissible because it was unfairly 
obtained. There were three factors which made the Judge 
decide. this way . First, the accused 1,1/as " in custody" at 
the time of questioning though not under arrest . Secondly , 
the manner of questioning without caution and by cross-
examination was improper under the Judge ' s rules and the 
law is against the concept of detention by the Police for 
the pUTposes of interrogation . Thirdly, the accused had 
s ought legal advice before malcing a statement but this was 
r efused . 
I n discussing the effect of the latter decision Doyle states 
(p 422) . 
"The :tvicDonald case is not only illustrative of the 
two proY1ged attack on confessions (voluntariness and 
unfairness) , it points out the possibilities which 
exist under the Courts broad discretion to exclude, 
quite apart from the voluntariness of the statement 
under the common law ors . 20 of the Evidence Act 
1 908 . Recent Judgments demonstrate that the 
discretion is concerned primarily with fairness , and 
while the Judge ' s Rules should be looked to for guid.ance , 
• 
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violations vnll not necessarily result in exclusion, 
especially if they are ~erely technical . Conversely, 
evidence maybe excluded in a situation where no 
specific Judge 1 s Rule was violated, as in the above 
cases confirming denial of access to a solicitor . " 
The United States Position 
Whereas the conunon law countries discussed have evolved 
their rules gradually through evidentiary principals the 
United States law as it now stands is based completely on 
constitutional considerations Originally the position in 
the United States was based, like the Commonwealth countries, 
on t}:l.e English conunon law. For a :mg time the principles 
developed in the same way as the English la\i; but \1n t~1 greater 
emphasis perhaps on the freedom of the individual . The 
approach adopted can be seen through examples such as 
Mallory v US (1957) 354 US 449 where the Supreme Court in 
exerc ising its supervisory power over the administration of 
Federal criminal justice rejected confessions that were 
secured during a period of detention that exceeded what was 
necessary to bring the accused before the Court vnthout 
unnecessary delay after arrest . 
however 
In the 1960s/the Supreme Court in the United States made a 
radic al and far - reaching change in its approach to the matter 
of c onfessions . The situation which exists now means that 
the Police are theoretically extremely hampered in their 
investigation of crime . Since the decisions there are 
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suggestions that in practice the Police are not fettered 
to the extent originally thought . i--Im1ever, the balance 
mentioned at the beginning of this paper, and which operates 
in England ; can be said to weigh too heavily in favour of 
the criminal in the United States . 
The case which indicated the start of the new approach 
was decided in 1964 . This is the decision of the United 
States Supreme Court in Escobedo v Illinois (1964) 378 US 
4 78 · ( 1 2 L. ed . 2 . 977). Escobedo was charged with 
murdering his brother- in- law. The law enforcement Officials 
took the Defendant into custody and interrogated him in a 
Pqlice station for the purpose of obtaining a confession . 
The Police did not effectively advise him of his right to 
remain silent or of his right to consult with his attorney . 
Rather they confronted him with an alleged accomplice who 
accused him of having perpetrated a murder . Hhen the 
Defendant denied the accusation and said "I didn't shoot 
Manuel ; you did it" they handcuffed him and took him to an 
interrogation room - there questioned him for four hours 
while he was standing - and denied him his right to spea:c to 
his attorney. His attorney in fact gave evidence as to this . 
At his trial the State, over his objection, inr~oduced a 
confession against him . 
The Supreme Court in holding the statement inadmissible 
stated that it was doing so on the ~ounds that the accused 
had been denied his fundamental right to Counsel under the 
6th Amendment . 
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Chief Justice ~larren in his decision in the later case of 
Miranda when referring to the Escobedo decision stated that 
the holding in Es.cobedo was not an innovation in 
jurispurdence but merely an application of prin~""Jlc s long 
recognised and applied in ot11er settings . Be that as it 
may it was the first in a series of decisions adopting a 
new approach to the question of confessions . If it had 
existed before it had certainly not been stated with such 
force in any earlier decision . 
The next series of decisions related to the 5th ~~endment 
right to the privilege against self incrimination . These 
are Miranda v State of J\rizona; Vignera v Ne\'./ Yor2c ; ':lestover v 
are 
US and California v Stewart . All/reported together (1966) 
384 US 436, 16 L. ed . 2d . 694. 
These cases deal with the admissibility of statements 
· obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial 
Police interrogation and the necessity for procedures whic11 
assure that the individual is accorded his privilege against 
seJf incrimination. In the opinion delivered by Chief Justice 
Uarren expressing the views of five members of the Court, 
governing principle.3 were laiddown , the most important of 
which is that , as a constitutional pre- requisite to the 
admissibility of such statements the suspect must , in the 
absence of a clear, intelligent waiver of the constitutional 
rights involved, the warning prior to questioning that he 
has a right to remain silent, that any stater.1ent he does 
make maybe used as evidence against him and that he has a 
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right to the presence of an attorney either retained or 
appointed . Clark J dissenting in part andconcu:xing in 
part , expressed the view that the admissibility of a 
confession obtai.Jed b; custodial interrogation should depend 
on the "totallity of circumstances" . Three Judges dissented 
expressing the view that the decision of the Court 
represented poor constitutional law and entailed harmful 
consequences for the country at large . In a further 
. minority opinion written by Vir Justice Uhi te it was stated 
that the proposition that the privilege against self-
incrimination forbids in- custody interrogat::m without the 
warnings specified and without a clear waiver of Counsel 
has no significant support in the history of the privilege 
or in the language of the 5th Amendment . 
The facts of eac h of the cases is as follows : 
a. Miranda 
The Defendant was arrested by the Police and taken 
t o a special interrogation room where he signed a 
c onfession which contained a typed paragraph 
stating that the confession was made voluntarily 
with full knowledge of his legal rights and with 
the understanding that any statement he r:i.ade might 
cJ. n 
be used against him . At his trial id Arizona State 
Court , at which the confession was admitted in 
evidence, he was convicted of kidnapping and rape . 
On appeal , the Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed 
on certiorari, the Supreme Court of US reversed , 
holding that the Defendant ' s confession was 
rn 
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inadmissible because? he was not in any "''ay 
appraised of his right to Counsel nor his privilege 
against self- incrimination affectively protected 
in any other manner . 
b . Vignera 
The Defendant made an oral confession to the Police 
after interrogation in the afternoon and then signed 
an inculpatory statement upon being questioned by an 
assistant District Attorney later the same evening . 
At his trial in a New York State Court on a charge 
of robbery, the defence was pr2c luded from making any 
showing that warnings of his right to Counsel and 
his right to silence had not been given . His conviction 
was affirmed by the Appellate Division, Second Departr.1ent 
and by the Court of Appeal , remit-i::itur amended . On 
Certiorari the Supreme Court of the United States 
·reversed on the g-.cound that the Defendant was not 
warned of any of his rights before the questioning 
by the Police and by the assistant District Attorney, 
and that no steps were taken to protect these rights . 
c. '.'lestove;r 
The Defendant was arrested by Kansas City Police as 
a suspect in Kansas City's robberies, and was 
interrogated in the private interview room of the 
Police Department for a lengthy period . He was then 
handed over to the FBI and interrogated by three 
special agents, who after some two hours obtained two 
signed confessions to each of two California robberies 
m 
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(Federal offences) . At his trial in the United 
States District Court for the northern district of 
California, at which the confessions obtained by 
the FBI were admitted in evidence, he vas convicted 
0£ the California robberies , and his conviction vras 
af firined by the Court of Appeal for the 9th Circuit . 
On certiorari the Supreme Court of the United States 
reversed on the ground that the Defendant did not 
knowingly and intelligently waive his rights to remain 
silent and his right to consult with Counsel prior to 
the time he made the confessions, since the 
interrogations , though conducted by two legally 
distinct law enforcement authorities , had the impact 
on him of a continuous period of questioning . 
d . Stewart 
Local California Police held the Defendant in the 
station for five days and interrogated him on nine 
separate occasions before they secured his confession , 
the defendant denying the alleged offences through 
eight of the interrogations . At his trial in a 
California State Court on a charge of kidnapping 
to commit robbery , rape and murder , his confession 
was introduced in evidence . He was convicted but 
on appeal the Supreme Court of California reversed , 
holding th&t the confession was not admissible because 
the defendant should have been advised of his right 
to remain silent and of t1is right to counsel. On 
certiorari , the Supreme Court of the United States 
affirmed on the ground that the Court would not 
presume that the defendant had been effectively 
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appraised of his ri9ht, on a record which did not 
j th ,1t sho any warnings h a d been given or tha t arq e f 2ecti ve 
alternative had been effiployed . 
The Court in re a ching these decisions de- ved far dee per 
into the principles relating to confessions i n Ar:,erican 
Law tha n any previous Court h ad ever gone . At page 439 
Chief Justice warren who delivered the ma jority decision 
states: 
11 The cases before us raise questions which go to the 
roots of our concepts of American crirr,ina l jurisprudence : 
the restraints society must observe consistent with 
the Federal Constitution in prosecuting i ndividuals 
for crimes . More specifically , we deal with the 
admi ssi bili ty of stater.~ent s obtained f ro, an 
individual who is subjected to custodi a l and Police 
interrogation and the necessity for procedures whi c h 
assure that the individual is a ccorded his privilege 
under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not 
to be compelled to incriminate hi 1~ self . 11 
The holding of the Court is st a ted at pages 444- 445 of 
the report and c an be listed as follows . 
( a) The prosecution may not use st a teient s , whether 
exculpatory or inculpatory, sten 'r1ing fror:", custodi a l 
interrogation of the defendant unless it derr,onstrates 
the use of procedura l safeguards e£fective·to secure 
the privilege against self incrir,,ina ti on . 
(b) By custodia l interrogation the Court .eant the 
uestioning initiated by l.:i.w e1 forcc1 .c1 t officers 
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a f ter d person had been taken into custody or otherwise 
deprived of his freedon of action in any si gni.fic:ant 
way. 
The procedural saf eguards wer2 also list-2d as follows : 
(a) Prior to any que stioning the per s on :-1mst be warned 
that he has a right to remain silent, that any 
statement he does make may be used as evidence against 
him, and that he has a right to the presence of an 
attorney, either retained or appointed. 
( b) The defendant may waive these rights provided the 
waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently . 
(c) If, however , he indicates in any ~anner at any stage 
of the process that he wishes to consult with an 
attorney before speaking there can be no questioning . 
( d) · Like wise if the individual is alone and indicates in 
any manner that he does not 'lk'ish to be interrogated 
the Police may not question hira . 
( e) The mere fact that he may '..1ave answered so1. e questions 
or volunteered some statements on his own does not 
deprive him of the right to refrain frorr. answering 
any further inquiries until he has consulted with an 
attorney and thereafter consented to questionina . 
(£) If interrogation continues without the presence of 
an attorney and a stater:-,ent is taken there is a 
heav-1 onus on the prosecution to de nonstrate that the 
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his 
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privilege a gainst self incrii.ination and right to 
retained or appointed counsel . 
In devising these rules the Court drew inf orrna ti on from 
the Police techni ques of interrogatior. a s described in 
their n,a nua l rather than c --' se records a s a guide to what 
happened to the detainee after apprehension by the Police. 
The Court accepted that there were abuses of Police power 
and i n fact set out examples of this . Af ter discussing 
such examples Chief Justice warren stated further at 
page 447 : 
11 The examples given above are undoubtedly the exception 
now, but they are sufficiently widespread to be the 
object of concern. Unless a proper liffiitation upon 
custodial interrogation is achieved - such as these 
decisions will advance - there can be no assurance 
that practices of this nature will be eradicated 
in the foreseeable future . 11 
In considering the rationale for the Courts sudden change 
in approac h it c an be seen that the Court was concerned, 
first , with the eradication , if that were possible , of 
Police excesses in interrogation. Secondly, it was 
concerned that all confessions were voluntarily made 
and l ast that confessions were truthf ully 11 ade . These 
underlying rationalisations are in many respects simil ar 
to those forming the basis of the common law rules . 
As to what constitutes a voluntary conf ession the Court 
cited Mr Justice Brandeis in \'Ian v. u. s . 266 u. s. 1 where 
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he stated: 
"··. the requisite of voluntariness is not satisfied 
by establishing merely that the confession was not 
induced by a promise or threat . A conf ession is 
voluntary in law if , and only if, it was, in fact , 
voluntarily made • 
• • • 
But a confession obtained by compulsion n.ust be 
0 x~luded whatever may have been the character 0£ 
the compulsion, and whether the compulsion was 
applied in a judicial proceeding or otherwise . 11 
In discussing the right to have counsel present Chief 
Justice warren at page 466 of Hiranda showed that the 
truth of confessions presented in evidence was a relevant 
consideration . 
,iThat counsel is present when statements are 
taken from an individual during interrogation 
obviously enhances the integrity of the fact finding 
processes in Court. The presence oi an attorney , 
and the warnings delivered to the individual enabled 
the defendant under otherwise co:-:ipelling circumstances 
to tell his story without fear , effectively, and in 
a way that eliminates the evils in the interrogation 
process. 11 
To show that the Court was not concerned that their 
radical approach would lead to widespread lawlessness 
the Chief Justice considered the other jurisdictions of 
Scotl and , England , India, Ceylon and the Uniforr.1 Code of 
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Military Justice wherein restriction on obtaining 
confessions a re delineated . He then went on to say at 
page 489 of the report : 
11 There: a ppears to have been no marked detrir.,ental 
e ffect on crimina l l aw enforcerrent in these 
jurisdictions as a result of these rules . Conditions 
of law enf orcement in our country are suff iciently 
similar to permit reference to this experience 
as assurance that lawlessness will not result 
from warning an individual of his ri ghts or a llowing 
lS 
him to exercise them . Moreover , it/consistent with 
our legal system that we give at least as :r:mch 
protection to these rights as is given in tne 
jurisdictions described . Wedeal in our country 
with rights grounded in a specif ic requirer.,ent of 
the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution , whereas 
·other jurisdictions arrive at their conclusions 
on the basis o f principles of justice not so specifically 
defined. 11 
It is considered, however , that in stat ing this he was 
oversimplifying the approach adopted in the other 
jurisdic tions . The i1iranda decision went far f urther t flan 
any decision , at least in England , had ever gone in granting 
freedom to an accused person in the nanner of interrogation. 
It must be borne in mind al so that in the r,:iranda decisions 
the convictions originally entered were quashed. This 
is not to say however , that should a confession be 
irregularly obtained in a trial then an acquittal will 
result . The Chief Justice in Miranda made it plain that 
rn 
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the states would need to develop sone procedure whereby 
the validity of a confession could be tested independently 
of the main trial before it was adnitted in evidence . In 
English law of course the procedure adopted is the ~oire 
Dire . If a confession were to be excluded then a 
conviction could still result if the other evidence were 
sufficently strong . 
Because the l"liranda decisions were so innovative there 
was widespread discussion in the legal journals and 
periodicals of its likely effect. It has been stated 
earlier than the original expectations have not in all 
cases been met . There are suggestions that the Police 
have adapted their procedures to meet the requirements of 
Miranda and this has not lead to too severe a restriction 
on their activities in detection . In an artic~e in the 
Harvard Law Review (1966) Volume 80 at page 201 it is 
suggested that one gc:1.p left in the wall of warnings Bet out 
in Miranda is that the Police need not advise the suspec~ 
that they may not ask questions until he consents . This 
gives some idea of the approach which the Police have 
used in adapting . The strict interpretation of restrictions 
in an effort to limit their application is by no means new 
as the New Zealand experience with section 20 of the Evidence 
Act 1 908 shows . 
In an article in the Columbia Law Review (Protections For 
The Suspect under Miranda v. Arizona (1 967) 67 ·Columbia 
L. R. 645) the authors considered the problem .?rom a wider 
ambit and in an attempt to devise a procedure for improving 
the eternal problem o!: discrepancy between the Police and 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF wi:111Nr-.Tr.,._, 
- 57 -
the accused as to what happened during interrogation 
suggested the following : 
(a) The use of la\!ryers present - altnougn this presents 
a problem if the lawyer has to testify against his 
client. 
(b) Tape recordings of the interrogation . 
(c) ~hotographs and videotapes . 
(d) Eximination before a Magistrate . 
(e) Widespread reform of Police procedures . 
( f ) Legi sla ti ve reform limiting the tir:ie for 
interrogation, speedier arraign;:.ents and better 
records. 
Herman Schwartz in an article in (1965/1966) 33 Chicago 
Law Review 719 discusses the reasons benind the decisions , 
in particular the Escobedo decision . One of the most 
common explanations, he says, is that the decision was 
designed primarily to elimi11ate the possibility of 
a 
coerced confessions by preventing the creation of/coercive 
environment • A related explanation was that the case was 
a reaction to the Courts inability to penetrate the 
interrogation room to determine whether the confessions 
before it were indeed voluntary. Schwartz's article 
deals primarily with the retroactivity of the decisions 
and this matter was resolved for him when the Suprer:e Court 
one week after Iv.iranda decided that bo-ch Escobedo and 
Miranda would operate in those trials which began after 
t e respective d · tes of the delivery oI' the ecisions in 
1 
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Of the jurisdictions discussed in this paper the effect 
of r-Iiranda and its related decisions in the United States 
has meant that that country has the greatest control 
on its Police in ob·caining of confessions. It is debatable 
whether the law in that country is not now so restrictive 
that Police activity in obtaining confessi ons has been 
so curtailed as to be non- effective . There has certainly 
been a severe restriction placed on the detection of crime . 
The United States Supreme Court must have felt that the 
time had come to put some form of restraint on Police 
-misuse of powers but at the same time it is considered that 
the Miranda decision has gone too far past the happy 
medium which exists :in English law and most of the Australian 
States . That the majority was placing too wide an 
interpretation on the Fifth Amendment was not wi tl1ou t corr,r.,ent 
amongst the de ssenting decisions in Iv;iranda . 
Conclusion 
In surnr.1ari sing the four jurisdictions it can be seen that 
at both ends of the scale from the point of view of control 
are the juri sdic ti ons of the United States and Ne·.v Zealand . 
The latter has evolved its rules in a somewhat confused 
way so that the control on Police activity is ultimately 
le.ft to the completely subjective discretion o ~ the presiding 
Judge . In the United States on the other hand i:he controls 
are so restrictive that the danger of incapacity on the 
p art of the Police to carry oui: a traditional JB,Y·t of its 
detection of crime has a risen . The happy r.1ediu, is perhaps 
seen in tl1e English syster:. where a syster. of tir.~e honoured 
principles of law and Judges directions to the Police h~s 
::vol vcu . 
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Between \:he English system and that opera ting 111 New Zealand 
is the Victorian situation viflere having enacted a provision 
reducing the controls on Police the State has a1 lowed the 
Courts through interpretation to weaken the position to 
such an extent that much or the cor;.r.ion law originally 
thought inoperative now applies . 
Vientioned in the introduction to this paper is the report 
the English Cri1T,inal Law Revision Cor.u,ittee on the rights 
of the accused and its critique by the English Cri~inal 
Bar Association . The Bar Association • s main cri tici sr;, 
of the r~port is its see;, ing intention of changing the law 
to secure more convictions. The critique agrees that it 
is vital that delioerate law breakers should be brought 
to justice but considers it equally important that 
essential safeguards for the innocent are established . 
As stated earlier the report proposed that silence at 
the Police station could be 1 ,ade the subject of adverse 
c omment at the trial . In the face of criticis~s of this 
the Comrnitt02 said that the accused would retain his right 
of silence because it would not beco1:1e an of r'ence to keep 
silent . The Bar Association rightly stated that this 
argunent was unconvincing because 
11 A person cannot be described as having a right 
of silence if in exercising it he n-,ay well provide 
evidence against hirrlself of guilt oE an offence 
of which he ,. ay be entirely innocent . 11 
The Association ·urthermakes the point that when the report 
cor, plains that hardened crirr,inal s take advantage of the 
present rule to refuse to answer any questions so do 
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thousands of other citizens , l aw abiding as v1ell as 
of fenders . 
The critique then considers at length the other proposals 
of the Conmi t tee such as abolition of the cautions in their 
of 
pre sent f orm and the repl acins !them with a warning 
to the suspect that failure to speak up might result 111 
adverse inferGnces being drawn at his trial . Such proposals, 
the critique says , would make Police interrogation open ci.1ded 
and gi~ unacceptable powers to the Police. 
The report was obviously concerned that the waJ 111 which 
the law had developed was leading to a large number of 
hardened and sophis·ticated criminals obtainig acquittals 
in cases where confessions, 1f they could be obtained , 
would be heavily relied on in the absence of stronger evidence . 
However , if adopted the proposals would have 1~ to an 
over-reaction and a syster.1 fa r too op pre ssi ve . 
Finally this paper will deal in the /vnerican context with 
a new approach to this matter found in the book 11 The Liuits 
of Cri r.1ina l Sanction" by Eerbert L. Packer. Packer ' s thesis 
is evolved by relating aspects of the cri ,inal law to two 
models: tl1e Criire Control hodel and the Due Process l"·odel. 
It is interesting to relate these JTodels to the various 
jurisdictions. Of the two mode ls Packer states: 
11 The Crir.e Control -~ode l tends to de- er phasi se 
this adversary aspect of the process: The Due 
Process Model tends to r:1ake it central ." ( p . 1 5'/) 
He goes on ,:o say that the value syster;. that underlies 
the Crine Control Model is based on the proposition th1t 
m 
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the rep re ssi on of crir7, inal conduct is by far the .. ost 
i Ti,portant function to be perforr.1ed by the crimina l process . 
Adopting this basis t e Englis½ Crir::inal Law Revision 
' Co,i,11ittee 1 proposa l s are the Cri ue Control l'-i odel at its 
best . The systei, underlying t he Due Process Model on the 
other hand is likened to an obstacle course . Each of its 
successive stages is designed to present for,nidable 
i mpediments to carrying the accused any further along its 
process . Its idealogy is impressed on the formal structure 
of the ·1aw. 
In relating the models to the confession situation Packer 
states that the Crime Control :Model would operate on the 
foll owing asswr.pti ons : 
The Police cannot be expected to solve crimes by independent 
investigation alone and the best source of inf ormati on is 
the suspect himself . Ace ordingly the police r.·.ust have a 
reasonable opportunity to interrogate a suspecL in private 
before he has a chance to fabricate a story or to decide 
that he will not co- operate . Psychologically the best 
time to achieve this is i :r.1mediately after his a rrest and 
he s..vould not be allowed to sur. mon his fa;,.ily or f riends 
or more i mportantly his lawyer . 
The police under this 1r.odel should not be entitled to 
hold the suspect for interrogation inde f iniLely nor 
would they want to clo so . The point of diminishing returns 
in interrogation is re ached .fairly soon . The length of 
Lime will be a ma tLer for the circu .stances of each case . 
The suspect ' s family should know where he is but not 
m 
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co-offender is still at large e·.,,·en the suspect' s family 
should know where he is . 
No hard and fast rules should be laid do·;rn and the rules 
should be so .8..exible that good faith ri1istakes by the Police 
should not be penalised . 
As far as confessions themselves are concerned any trustworthy 
stater ent obtained fror a suspect during interrogation 
should be admissible . If Police coercion is alleged 
then the onus is on the sus?ect to convince the trier 
that such coercion lead to an untrue adrrission being made . 
The Due Process Model would , however , operate on different 
assumptions . The decision to arrest would need to be based 
on probable cause to suspect a crime had been committed by 
the pe r son arrested . He is to be arrested to anD!tc.." the 
ca se against him not s o that the case against him can be 
developed . 
He must be brought before the court without unnecessary 
delay . Once before the Court conditions of bail must be 
pr omptly set . He is to be entitled to Counsel as soon as 
he is arrested . 
It is never proper for the Police -co hold a suspect for interrog-
ation -or investiga1:i0n . The Police .ay question him during 
the time after arrest and his appearance be.2ore the Court . 
As soon as the suspect is urrested, he should be told 
by the Police that he is under no obligation to answer 
questions , that he will not suffer by refusing to answ2-r 
questions , that he ,ay answer questions to cleo.r l1i, self 
rn 
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but that his answers ~ay be used in evidence against 
him and t1at he is entitled to Com1sel . 
Any confession will not be aciri issible if the Police failed 
to warn hir.-l of his rig11ts , if he was questioned a.Eter 
the warnings were given unless he waived his :eights , if 
the confession was obtained during a period of detention 
exceeding that necessary to bring him before the Court 
after his arrest and if the confession W.J. S obtained by 
force . 
The rationale of such an exclusion 1s not that the 
confession is untrustworthy but that it offends against 
the rule that it is up to the State to prove its case 
without .fbrcing the suspect to co-operate in treprocess . 
Packer having set forth the two models then goes on to 
consider the Miranda and Eallory decisions \l/hich quite 
cle arly corne within the Due Process :i•iodel . Indications 
are , he states, that Hiranda has not appreciably reduced 
the number of confessions made and if }liranda does l10t 
produce the intended effect the Court is likely to take 
the next step in the Due Process Model of flattly prohibiting 
the use in evidence of staten,ents ;;:ade by suspects to the 
Police. 
Under New Zealand and Victorian law of c ourse the law has 
developed towards the Criir,e Control Model ( to the extent 
. that section 20 applies) \l/hile in England the opposite is 
the case. 
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On t 1e question of access to Cl'"\unsel Pa cl<er again 
relates the issue to the two r,~odels . 'l'he Crime Control 
Model in this respect is based on the following asswr.ptions :. 
The phase were interrogation takes place is investigative 
not judicial . The defendant's rights are sufficiently 
protected by the of fer to see th o. t his lavyer , if he 
has one , is notified that he is being held. There is no 
reason why the defendant should be given the right to see 
his lawyer during the interrogation period . The Police 
should have no interference at this stage. The Police do 
not arrest without probable cause and this is their only 
chance to enlist the c o- operation of the one person most 
likely to know the truth . The lawyer will tell hir, to say 
n o~hing and the Police will be given a harder job and 
an innccentsuspect won ' t be able to clear himself . The 
only assistance of a lawyer is therefore to a guilty suspect . 
If the police are not allowed to operate in this way the 
pro·tection which the community enjoys against criminal 
activity will decline . Finally a lawyer ' s place is in 
Court - he should not enter a case until this stage . 
The Due Process Model can be best shown by using ?acker ' s 
exact description (page 203) : 
11 A hardened and sophisticated crir.1ina1 knows enough 
to keep silent in the face of Police interrogation . 
He knows that self exculpatory stater,1ents are 
of ten incriminating . He knows tha·c he does not 
have -co talk and that he is not likely to realise 
any advantage by talking . An inexperienced 
person in t he toils of t ~e l aw cnows non~ o ( this. 
rn 
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Unless the opercttive rules forbid it the situations 
of these t·.vc, catagories of suspect are bound to 
be unequal . 
Likewise , there is no mo.-c1ent in the criminal process 
when the disparity in resources between the State 
and the accused is greater than at the moment of 
arrest . There is every opportunity for over-reaching 
and abuse on the part of the Police . There is no 
limit to the extent to which these opportunities 
are taken advantage of except in the Police' s own 
sense of self- restraint . Later correctives palli~te 
but do not suffice . what actually takes place in 
the Police station is known only to the suspect 
and to the Police . It is not hard to predict 
whose word will be taken if a contradiction arises . 
The only way to ensure that these two equally 
obnoxious forms of inequality do not have a ci.eci si vely 
malign impact on the criminal process is to require 
at the time of arrest (1) that tne suspect be i r:1mediately 
apprised of his right to rer:La in silent and to have 
a lavr1er ; (2) that he pro;::p tly be given acce ss to 
a la\lrJ1::r, either his own or one appointed f or him; 
or ( 3 ) that failing the presence of a lalfyer to 
protect the suspect • s interest , he not be subjected to 
Police interrogation. 11 
The crnnr, on la\'/ coun-cries have no established rules o.2 la\', 
on: ·the right ot Counsel . To this extent the theory at least 
tt.e:; perhaps tend towards the Crime Control rv:odel . The Judges 
~ 
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Rules in their various forn:s ho1J1ever probably provide 
adequate protection 3Yld in practice the Due Process Eoclel 
applies . In Arr,erica of course the Escobedo and :-:iranda 
decisions leave no doubt that the Due Process i·iodel operates . 
Surprisingly the r ecent developt,ents in New Zealand c ase 
l aw show that New Zealand in this respect has opted qui te 
clea rly in favour of the Due Process ·v1octel . 
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